Jim Guthrie asks: "So are you saying the E-L Management was incompetent for demanding to be included in the N&W merger? Or in agreeing to the arms-length DERECO" I haven't written or implied that. But it's an interesting subject. John Kneiling's Trains column periodically took potshots at EL, which he supplemented in some letters to me. His point of view was that EL and the Milwaukee had a great opportunity to launch containerized land-bridge services while abandoning local freight service as fast as they could. The first time this idea was proposed in print, White replied with a letter to the editor that dismissed it as "crackpot" or something similar. Afterwards, Kneiling would occasionally complain in print that EL management had no higher objective than to find refuge in a merger. In our brief correspondence, he tempered this somewhat by saying that they ran a better railroad than some others. William White seems to have been in the habit of brushing off "not invented here" ideas. In 1965 White returned a paper which Bill Howes of the B&O had written proposing consolidation of the Eastern railroads' passenger trains into an entity that presaged Amtrak, claiming that he did not have time to read and analyze it. (Fred Frailey, Twilight of the Great Trains (Kalmbach, 1998), p.188.) When we consider what regulatory obstacles would have had to be overcome for Kneiling's plan to be implemented, it becomes easier to understand White's reaction. In hindsight, Kneiling was right about the potential for landbridge trains and the necessity to radically cut back or at least reinvent local freight service, but he was too far ahead of his time. And it remains an open question whether EL could have survived and prospered on intermodal traffic, then or now. With regard to N&W, it seems that EL management played the cards they were dealt. The national transportation policy had long presupposed that weak railroads should be allowed to burden the strong, although implementation of this principle had been frustrated many times by railroad manuevering. The fact that it was in conflict with other elements of the same policy--financial health and preservation of essential service--no one much thought about so long as the railroads were making money. So there it was at the beginning of the Sixties, Joseph Eastman's old idea, not dead but sleeping, offering Erie Lackawanna a lifeline in the form of an ICC order conditioning approval of N&W/NKP/WAB on what became Dereco. White and Maxwell grabbed it, of course. Before we judge them, let's not underestimate the force of John Fishwick's point: EL was broke, and nothing could make the mountain of debt manageable except bankruptcy, unless we assume that N&W shareholders would somehow graciously agree to pay it off. Once the application for inclusion was made, Erie Lackawanna's choices were even more constrained. N&W out-manuevered them by persuading the ICC to allow it to keep EL debt off N&W's books while taking its net operating loss carryforwards, but what other choice remained at that point? The Dereco experience raises several interesting questions: 1.) How effectively were joint services marketed? Was N&W's dalliance with Lehigh Valley going on at the same time, or did that really kick in only after the bankruptcy in 1972? 2.) How much and how effectively was operating management coordinated? (More than some think, I suspect.) 3.) I've heard old D&H people say that Dereco was a takeover of the D&H by EL. To what extent was that true? Think about E8s and U33Cs on D&H, for example. 4.) Were N&W people still functioning in EL management after the 1972 bankruptcy? 5.) Post-1972, the trustees' minutes contain scattered indications of friction between N&W and EL--carping over the fact that N&W got the tax losses; struggles over whether EL would be allowed to eliminate LV's trackage rights between Owego and Binghamton, thus frustrating N&W's access to New England via LV; an improved Lake Junction connection affording access to CNJ without relying on LV; EL's court filings urging that LV be abandoned; and Maxwell's stated desire to obtain trackage rights over the Big Four between Marion and East St. Louis so as to avoid dependence on N&W. Bankruptcy court is a snakepit, with the various interests doing a lot of posturing, and the zero-sum circumstances bring out the worst in people. In addition, N&W's strategic interest differed from EL's, leading the parties to take different positions on the big question of whether EL should survive. Fishwick testified before Congress that EL should be preserved only east of Buffalo and Creston. The EL trustees, trying to get maximum value for the creditors, essentially urged that the whole thing be absorbed by Conrail. For Erie Lackawanna, Dereco quickly proved to be a bargain with the devil, and I mean the arrangement itself, not N&W, which made at least some effort to build upon the affiliation. The slide toward bankruptcy began in 1969, when $11 million in bonded debt originally incurred to build the River Line and Graham Line came due. This debt had almost put EL over the cliff in 1964, but was refinanced by William White with the help of an ICC order compelling the bondholders to extend it for five years. Can you imagine trying to refinance this in 1969, with EL now a subsidiary of Dereco? I am not privy to what actually occurred, but the situation speaks for itself. Every bank considering a refinancing would have asked for a guarantee from EL's "rich" parent, and backed away when told that no guarantee would be forthcoming. Whatever the reason, EL was unable to refinance, and cleaned out most of the cash in the till to pay off the bonds. WDB **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. (http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick. net/clk;211531132;33070124;e) The Erie Lackawanna Mailing List http://EL-List.railfan.net/ To Unsubscribe: http://Lists.Railfan.net/erielackunsub.html ------------------------------
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